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BLEAK PROSPECTS: How HEALTH CARE REFORM
HAS FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

*

This Article examines the probable fate that awaits the
systematic implementation of ObamaCare.Any effort to pile
a massive new transfer and entitlement program on top of a
hundred years of previous reforms is likely to fall prey to the
law of diminishing marginal utility of additional forms of
government intervention. That consequence is all the more
likely for legislation that has strong redistributivistobjectives
but which lacks any techniques for dealing with the massive
costs increases embedded in the program. A recent history of
the Massachusetts health care initiative provides some
indication of the inability to constrain costs except through
the imposition of price controls that could easily drive private
carriers into bankruptcy. The well-known Dartmouth Atlas,
moreover, provides no evidence that there are massive
inefficiencies that these price controls can bleed out of the
system. The complex system of private health care exchanges
or the certain expansion of Medicaid and the unlikely
contraction of Medicare are likely to add only greater
pressures to an already unworkable system.

* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall
Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This Article is a
much-expanded version of a speech that I delivered at the Chicago's Best Ideas
lecture series, entitled "Can the United States Survive Health Care Reform?" on
April 8, 2010. I have updated the talk to take into account events that occurred
after the original speech was delivered. My thanks to Isaac Gruber, University of
Chicago Law School Class of 2012, for his usual excellent research assistance.
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1. INTRODUCTION: DIMINISHING MARGINAL RETURNS TO
EVERYTHING

Over the past two years, the United States has entered
into a phase of active government. Yet of all the many items
on the agenda of President Barack Obama, none has proved
more contentious, and it appears more unpopular, than his
health care initiative.' The statute has a peculiarly awkward
and self-aggrandizing title: the Patient Protection and
Affordable Health Care Act. 2 It is likely that ObamaCare, as
it is now known, for better or worse, will not supply patients
with protection from anything except their own best
judgment. Nor will its heavy and convoluted administrative
provisions make health care more affordable, even though it
will, through a crazy-quilt set of taxes and regulations, shift
the forms of health care distribution in ways that are at
present only dimly known. As long and as convoluted as the
ObamaCare legislation is, it is only a small down payment
on a massive set of initiatives whose content will become
clear, if at all, only through the regulations that are now
being fought over on the key features of the bill. It seems
clear that this incipient and chaotic health care revolution
will, unless it is hindered, delayed, watered down, or
1. See, e.g., Jennifer Haberkorn, Dems Run Away From Health Care, POLITICO
(Sept. 5, 2010), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=DE1E691B-18FE-70B2A813ACC3D55691DE ("A Kaiser Family Foundation poll ... showed 43 percent of
the public supports the [health care] overhaul and 45 percent are opposed. Much of
the disagreement falls along party lines.").
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare), Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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repealed, surely count as a larger and ultimately more
dramatic change than the 1965 Medicare legislation which
was one of the centerpieces of President Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society. 3
Before we turn to any of its particulars, it is useful to set
out in a priori terms the reasons why ObamaCare is likely to
crater and to do so in grand fashion. The key principle has
nothing to do with health care in specific. Rather, it rests on
the general proposition that there are diminishing marginal
returns to any activity that government or private parties
attempt, including increased government regulation. In the
United States, we have experienced four major waves of
government regulation in the past hundred years.
The first of those waves began with the progressive
reforms of Woodrow Wilson's administration, especially in
areas of trade regulation. That period saw the creation of the
Federal Trade Commission in 19144 and the passage of the
Clayton Act 5 that same year. The Clayton Act strengthened
enforcement of the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act,6 while at
the same time exempting both labor unions and agriculture
from the strictures of the antitrust laws in a clear form of
selective interest group regulation.
Matters slowed during the First World War and the 1920s,
but the dislocations of the 1929 stock market crash and its
aftermath ushered in a second wave of progressive reforms
during the New Deal. The New Deal properly begins with
Herbert Hoover's administration, and not Franklin
Roosevelt's. Even before Roosevelt took office, Hoover
presided over passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,7 the
Davis-Bacon Act of 1931,8 massive tax increases of the
Revenue Act of 1932,9 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
3. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended at subchapter XVIII of 42 U.S.C.).
4. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)).
5. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27 (2006)).
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
7. Tariff Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley Tariff), Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1683g (2006)).
8. Pub. L. No. 71-798, 46 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 31413148 (2006)).
9. Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169.
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1932.10 Each of these actions in its own way limited the

sphere of private enterprise and increased the scope of
government power over the economy. The pace of that
regulatory oversight only increased during the Roosevelt
years, much of whose legacy is still in place. This legacy
includes the National Labor Relations Act," the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, 12 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,13
the Fair Labor Standards Act,' 4 and of course, the creation
of the Social Security system in 1935.15 As with the

legislation that preceded it, most of these statutes increased
government power over the economy, particularly by
strengthening labor and agriculture cartels until they
became a fixed feature of the American economy.
The third wave of regulation is a creature of the 1960s, the
Johnson Era, which continued through the Nixon
Administration in the early 1970s, proving that Democrats
have no monopoly on big government. The 1960s-era
legislation was directed less toward the traditional
beneficiaries of regulation: agriculture, labor, and consumer
protection. Instead, it was largely a conscious effort to
increase the rate of transfer payments, either express or
implicit, from rich to poor.' 6 Much of it had to do with the
Civil Rights Act of 196417 and the Medicare and Medicaid

legislation.' 8 On other fronts, the third wave of legislation
regulated environmental protection,' 9 endangered species, 20
10. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70.
11. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (2006)).
12. Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
601-627 (2006)).
13. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78kk (2006)).
14. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (2006)).
15. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
16. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508
(repealed 1981) (creating numerous programs intended to provide social services to
the poor at the expense of taxpayers).
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
18. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (2006)).
19. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006)); National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
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employee pensions, 21 and workplace safety. 22 Although some
of these interventions are sensible, most are not. They
naively assume that wealth transfer is a zero-sum game and
that society only faces a question as to how great a loss in
wealth is needed to secure any increase, by some elusive
standard, in individual utility. Without question, all of this
legislation increases the government's role in both the
regulation of private businesses and in the direct operation
of the economy.
These first three waves form the backbone of our modern
regulatory state. Yet despite this large regulatory overhang,
the newest round of feverish legislative activity contains not
one single word about deregulation, which would have the
dual benefit of raising tax revenues and reducing
government expenditures. 23 Far from alleviating earlier
burdens, this latest wave of regulation is, in fact, far more
intrusive than any of the previous three. My view is that
with this wave of regulation, the United States has now
crossed the point of diminishing returns-even if, as I
believe was the case, we had not crossed it earlier. The
expected cost of running the entire regulatory apparatus,
especially its health care component, will turn out to be
exceedingly high under any accurate accounting of the
burdens that these measures impose. On the other side, the
supposed benefits of such regulation will turn out to be both
evanescent and uncertain.
The only certain consequence of the ObamaCare
regulation is a dismal one: an unfortunate mad scramble of
political intrigue as various health care providers and
groups seek to secure favorable places or reimbursement
rates for their own particular programs. In my judgment,
4321-4370 (2006)); Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006)).
20. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified

as amended at 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1531-1544 (2006)).

21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
22. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006)).
23. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Controlling the Costs of
Medical Care: A Dose of Deregulation 18, 38 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 418, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1158547.
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the persistent decline in both liberty and prosperity in the
United States will continue apace. The great battle of the
next generation will not identify those able to garner the
lion's share of a social gain created by a vibrant economy. It
will address a more tragic question: in a time of falling
wealth, who is going to bear the brunt of the decline?
Generally speaking, fights over prosperity add some levity
into the air. Fights over deprivation, on the other hand, only
produce a level of ugly recrimination that nobody wants to
witness. As we all know, the political climate in Washington
today seems to be more divisive and acrimonious than it has
been in many years. 24 The resentments are not limited to
bipartisan quarrels. They go to fundamental differences in
worldview that drive every modern controversy. These
differences play out over all aspects of health care reform at
the state and federal level. The main dispute is over the
ultimate measure of social welfare in the United States.
I am a dyed-in-the-wool traditional, consequentialist
Paretian-aterm that derives from Vilfredo Pareto, who
first identified this measure of social welfare. 25 To be sure, it
seems hard to get worked up over a term that no one quite
understands or a great economist whom no one quite
remembers. Paretianism does not raise a banner under
which a candidate can win a lot of votes. But it is
worthwhile to explain why this measure of social welfare
proves so attractive in principle. Under the Pareto principle,
the differences in wealth between one person and another
are rendered irrelevant. Instead, the key question to ask
about any coercive form of government interaction is
whether or not it is capable of generating a Pareto
improvement. What that term means is this: is it possible to
find a way, through state intervention, to make at least
some people better off and nobody else worse off? Ideally, it
would be better if everyone could be made better off
24. For one side of the political coin, see Richard Sisik, Glenn Beck Says
America is Wandering into the Darkness Because of 'Divisive Politics, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.comlnews/national/2010/08/28/201008-28_glennbeck-says-washington rallys-purposeis to helpeadamerica out_
of the dar.html. For the other side, see Bob Herbert, America Is Better than This,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/opinion/
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
28herbert.html ("[Glenn] Beck is an ignorant, divisive, pathetic figure.").
25. See VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 261 (Ann S.
Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., 1971) (1906).
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simultaneously. 26 But even if only the first objective can be
achieved, and no one is made worse off, it would no longer be
necessary to look with suspicion on the differentials in
wealth that emerge through voluntary market transactions
or government interventions. The second objective, however,
which is to make everyone better off simultaneously, is less
problematic because both parties receive gains and it is not
necessary to worry unduly about exactly which party
happens to get which particular benefit. State coercion finds
it more difficult to reach that position of mutual advantage,
though in select cases-such as the control of force or
monopoly-it can.
So as long as you are expanding the size of the social pie,
competitive forces will tend to create wealth distributions
that will be less extreme than it might first appear. This
proposition holds even with respect to the very rich. If the
rich compete for their economic returns, much like monopoly
profits, they will be exposed to pressure from new entrants
into their line of business, and the "free money" to which all
of us aspire will be available to none of us. So we work to
expand the pie knowing that each individual will take care
of his or own slice-so long as the government role is
circumscribed.

II. SOCIAL WELFARE AND HEALTH CARE
At this juncture, our question becomes: how should this
Paretian worldview be applied to the problem of healthcare?
The answer is to start with deregulation where the social
returns are likely to be the greatest. There are too many
layers of regulation in the United States health care system.
Many of them have survived for purely parochial or
historical reasons. Virtually all of these reforms have proved
unwise and should be eliminated.
First, we should remove the present prohibitions on
interstate competition with respect to insurance in the
individual and in the group markets. 27 Given that politics
often makes for strange bedfellows, it should come as no
26. I have argued for stricter standards of social improvement, with constraints
on the division of the surplus in order to control factional behavior. See RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 79-82, 98-103 (1993).

27. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§

1011-1015 (1945).
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surprise that ObamaCare took the opposite tack. 28 Thus, any
government that actively seeks a more comprehensive
system of redistribution will soft-pedal deregulation in order
to keep the support of those insurance companies that reap,
or at least think they reap, their monopoly profits from state
barriers to entry.
The position of these insurance companies is, however,
always made more precarious by yet another regulatory
feature that merits rapid extinction: insurance mandates.
Companies that want to write insurance policies are always
free to withdraw from the business, which they will not do
because, by taking that step, they lose all chance to recover
their sunk costs and to make their future profits. So wedded
to the marketplace, they must comply with certain minimum
standards imposed by either state or federal mandates, all of
which gum up the operation of voluntary markets. 29 These
are not isolated events. The Council for Affordable Health
Insurance (CAHI) produced a detailed catalogue of some
1,961 state mandates as of 2008. Its report contained the
warning that "more [mandates] are on their way."30
State governments are not the only actors in this game.
Congress passed a federal mandate during the height of the
financial crisis, in September 2008, aiming for parity in
mental health benefits for all people in the United States
enrolled in private plans. 31 The effect of such mandates,
many hundreds of which are now in effect, often goes
unobserved on a daily basis but its cumulative effect is real.
It is, invariably, to reduce the sum of consumer and
producer surplus with respect that both customers and their
insurers derive from the voluntary plans that remain in
28. Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Law Could Ban Low-Cost Plans, POLITICO
(June 8, 2010), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=142CBE3B-18FE-70B2A82B 15071E682918.
29. VICTORIA CRAIG BUNCE & JP WIESKE, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH
INS., HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2008, at 2 (2008), available at
http://www.cahi.org/cahi-contents/resources/pdf/HealthInsuranceMandates2008.pd
f. For updates, see VICTORIA CRAIG. BUNCE & JP WIESKE, COUNCIL FOR
AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2010,
(2010), available at http://www.cahi.org/cahi-contents/resources/pdflMandatesinthe
States2010.pdf.
30. BUNCE & JP WIESKE, HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2008,
supra note 20, at 2.
31. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765, 3881-93 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5).
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business. In concrete terms, CAHI "estimate[d] that
mandated benefits currently increase the cost of basic health
coverage from a little less than 20% to more than 50%,
depending on the state and its mandates." 32
These numbers should not be ignored. On theoretical
grounds alone, the size of the consumer and producer
surplus has to decrease as the number and severity of
mandates increase. If the new item was worth more than it
cost, health care providers and insurers would have every
incentive to include it in the basic plan, by sharing the
gains. But a smaller combined surplus can still be positive,
so that those plans remain in place so long as both sides can
absorb the hit. This reduction in the combined surplus,
however, technically counts as a social loss even if it is never
recorded in any official social account that looks solely at the
numbers of insured persons currently on the private rolls.
But on some occasions, the size of the tax comes to exceed
the combined surplus to the parties, and the insurance
coverage dissolves. It is yet another instance of the principle
of diminishing marginal social returns. When the
government starts putting on the next round of mandated
benefits, the entire package is no longer worth having. Since
the insurer cannot get rid of that cargo that makes the boat
too heavy, the boat capsizes and sinks, thereby increasing
the number of uninsured individuals.
This is not a small phenomenon. Over the last thirty
years, the number of people with employer plans dropped
from about 60% to 50%.33 Even so, the precise numbers
really do not matter; what really counts is that the direction
of the trend is inexorable, and its size is not inconsiderable.
Yet once the employer boat is capsized by mandates, the
individuals who are left to fend for themselves in the
individual and small group markets, or on public support,
find it rough going indeed. The good news is that these
trends should be reversible. Therefore, with greater
competition and fewer mandates, the voluntary market
32.

BUNCE & JP WIESKE, HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2008,

supra note 29, at 2.
33. MARK W. STANTON, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTHCARE:

TRENDS AND ACCESS (2004), availableat
empspria.pdf.

http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empsprial
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should correspondingly revive as people are allowed to buy,
to suit their own preferences, a lower level of insurance
protection for a lesser sum of money.
As a social analyst, it is dangerous to base one's work on
some predetermined notion of what people need for their
own good. It is not that ordinary people are perfect judges of
their own character and aims. It is that they, with their
social network-family, employers, friends, church groups,
and other agents-will generally do a lot better making
judgments about their individual needs than the United
States government. To put it delicately, the administrative
agencies of the United States are not exactly run by
individuals whose constitutional and economic wisdom is
beyond reproach.
So, the essential logic of the small-government Paretoimprovement approach is to identify and remove these large
pockets of unwise regulation. This path cuts down state
administrative costs, increases the level of private choice,
opens access, and raises tax revenues. People will flock back
to insurance markets as the price for coverage goes down.
Unfortunately, the dominant philosophy in Washington
today moves in exactly the opposite direction. Even the
Chamber of Commerce, traditionally no bastion of
redistributionists, has an agenda that includes many of the
most objectionable features that made their way into
ObamaCare. These include: "[e]liminating the use of preexisting conditions or health status; [g]uaranteeing that any
individual or entity will be issued a policy; [g]uaranteeing
that policies will not be revoked; [p]lac[ing] reasonable limits
on rating differences; [s]ubsidies for those who cannot afford
coverage."34

This agenda shows no interest in designing legislative
reforms to promote Pareto improvements. On the contrary,
it evinces a concern for the elimination of wealth
differentials on the assumption that income redistribution is
one of the major objectives of health care reform. This shift
in approach is no small adjustment. It is a profound
transformation of how we think about the role of
34. Access to Affordable Health Care, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/health/access-affordable-health-care (last visited
Oct. 16, 2010).
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current welfare, for simplicity, equals ten units of wealth.
Now one of them improves to twelve units of wealth while
everyone else remains at ten units. A Paretian is quite
happy about that transformation because it generates a net
improvement of two units of wealth. 35
Yet that example, which illustrates a social improvement
under the Pareto standard, counts as anything but a success
if a strong form of egalitarianism is allowed to influence the
shape of our ultimate social goal. On that egalitarian
assumption, any deviation from that initial distribution of
parity which allows one person to advance more than any
other can no longer be regarded as an unquestionable social
improvement. It can be regarded as a festering source of
social unrest in the form of rising economic inequality. There
is no question that many supporters of health care reform
are driven not by a desire to expand the pie but rather by
their profound sense that equalization of the size of each
slice is the first order of business. In a press conference, here
is what Senator Max BaucuS 36 said about this issue:
Too often, too much of late, the last couple . . . years, the

maldistribution of income in America has gone up way too
much, the wealthy are getting way, way too wealthy, and
the middle income class is left behind. Wages have not
kept up with the increased income of the highest incomes
of Americans. This legislation will have the effect of
addressing that maldistribution of income in America. 37

35. I use wealth in this example because it is more easily measured than utility.
In principle, however, the same argument holds even if we deal with subjective
utility. All we need to do is report that every person but one remains the same, and
that last person experiences an improvement in his or her personal position. But
utilizing wealth is preferable in these examples, because it is a publicly observable
unit which better facilitates comparisons and overall assessments. A flawed
measure that can be counted is better for social purposes than a more reliable
theoretical standard that proves unadministrable in practice.
36. Senator Baucus also, incidentally, admitted to not reading the entire

ObamaCare bill. See Jordan Fabian, Key Senate Democrat Suggests That He Didn't

Read Entire HealthcareReform Bill, THE HILL (Aug. 25, 2010), http://thehill.com/
blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/115749-sen-baucus-suggests-he-did-not-read-entirehealth-bill.

37. Dem Senator: Health Legislation Will Address the "Mal-Distributionof
Income in America," REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Mar. 25, 2010),
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It is hard to know where to begin with this hyperbolic
statement. The first point goes to implicit rejection of the
Pareto formula. The rich are getting "way too wealthy" even
if their wealth does not come from transfer payments taken
from the poor. For Baucus, it is the size of the gap that is the
wrong; not the source of its origin. Yet increased wealth in
the system has all sorts of collateral consequences, including
higher tax revenues for the United States Treasury. On this
point, tax cuts increase overall wealth and tax revenues, as
is well illustrated by this chart from the Internal Revenue

Taxes and the Rich
Income taxes paid, in billions of dollars, by
adju sted gross income, in2003 and 2008
2003

$200,000 or more
$1million or more
$5 nilIion or more
$10 million or more

$313
132
55
35

M00

$537
249
118
84

incrase

72%
89
115
140

Source: IR5, Satistks of Im c. Tib I 1I
Service (IRS).3 8
The data are even more impressive than this table
indicates, for in any dynamic sense, lower rates translate
into higher tax revenues. Government estimates usually rely
on the naive assumption that changes in tax rates do not
alter behavior, when quite the opposite is true. In one of its
most recent (and sound) diatribes against higher taxation,
the Wall Street Journal published:

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2010/03/25/demsenatorhealth_1egislation
willaddressthemal-distributionof incomeinamerica.htm.
38. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, tbl. 1.1 (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil08inllsi.xls; STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS,
tbl. 1.1 (2005), availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03inllsi.xls.
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According to the most recent IRS data on actual tax
payments, total revenues collected over the period 2003-07
were about $350 billion higher than Joint Tax and the
Congressional Budget Office predicted when the 2003 tax
cuts were enacted. Moreover, the wealthiest taxpayers
paid a larger share of all income taxes from the beginning
to the end of this period. The IRS data show that in 2003
those with incomes above $200,000 paid $313 billion in
income tax. By 2007 they paid $610 billion. 39
Of these trends, Senator Baucus is blissfully ignorant.
Worse still, Baucus assumes descriptively that a ponderous
health care bill will have the effect of moving wealth from
poor to rich simply because that comports with his intention.
But here the crisscross pattern of provisions will vindicate
the law of unintended consequences by inducing a set of
displacements and responses that could easily lead to losses
to individuals who may actually like their current situation,
which they will not be able to replicate under the new
legislation. In addition, administrative drag and perverse
incentives mean there will be less wealth to go around,
which cannot help those who are poor. A better solution is to
expand the pie and worry about distribution only after those
allocative gains are made, by a policy that I like to call
"redistribution last."40
III. OVER THE EDGE

In its largest sense, the major problem for any program of
redistribution is whether it can be executed in ways that do
not shrink the size of the pie. In the case of ObamaCare, the
correct answer is no, even if the answer for more modest
programs may be yes. The yes answer for the modest state
41
programs comes from my sense, shared by many others,
that low levels of persistent government redistribution will
be met with a high level of popular acceptance. If anyone
28, 2010),
39. The $31 Billion Revenue Fantasy, WALL ST. J. 0 0(Aug.
62 39 2 66 89
2
4.ht
1 4
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703876404575
ml (emphasis in original).
40. Richard A. Epstein, DecentralizedResponses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck,
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 309 (2008).
41. See generally, Arthur C. Brooks, A Nation of Givers, THE AMERICAN,
(Mar./Apr. 2008), http://www.american.com/archive/2008/march-april-magazinecontents/a-nation-of-givers.
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watches how people spend their own money, they may not
tithe themselves the full 10%, but they are always willing up
to a point to help out through churches, other social groups,
hospital drives, and public service campaigns for those less
fortunate than themselves. However, like every other good
thing on planet Earth, too much of a good thing becomes a
bad thing. The law of diminishing marginal returns to scale
also applies to charitable endeavors. In other words, the
marginal cost of extra units of redistribution relative to their
benefit eventually goes negative. The great danger that I see
in the current health care system is that we have now
passed the point of optimal redistribution and are very much
on the downward slide. I think that today's resentments
have all coalesced around this basic concern of the median
voter in the United States: "As hard as I work, am I left
worse off than I was before because of a series of programs
that allow opportunists to profit at my expense?" 42
To go beyond health care for the moment, take President
Obama's announcement of yet another misguided program
with respect to additional relief for those people who have
fallen behind on their mortgage payments. 43 It turned out
that the dominant response that came to the White House
was from people in control of their own mortgages saying,
"Why do I want to live in a country which is going to tax me
enough so they might throw me into default?" 44 What should
be done with these mortgages is to allow the foreclosures.
Let the property then return to the market at their lower
but more accurate valuations. At that point, new saleswhich fell to an all-time low in July 2010 45-can pick up,
42. For an example of this concern, see John Hood, The Great Redistribution
Machine, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/139731/great-redistribution-machine/john-hood.
43. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123
Stat. 1632. For my criticism of this type of legislation, see Richard A. Epstein, The
Subprime Crisis: Why One Bad Turn Leads to Another, 2 J. Bus.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 198 (2008).

44. See, e.g., John W. Schoen, No 'Magic Bullet' in Obama Housing Relief Plan,
MSNBC.coM (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29260537/ ("Many
homeowners, some of whom also are struggling to make payments, are furious at
the prospect of seeing their taxes used to help pay their neighbor's mortgage.").
45. New Home Sales at All-Time Low, CBS NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010),
("[N]ew
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/25/business/main6804275.shtml
home sales fell 12.4 percent in July from a month earlier to a seasonally adjusted
annual sales pace of 276,600. That was the slowest pace on records dating back to
1963.').
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without having to deal with legacy obligations artificially
kept unrealized on both the public and the private books. I
think that this tough-minded view is exactly the right
sentiment to hold on that issue. The miserable performance
of the government's Home Affordable Modification
Program 46 (HAMP) is typical of the current situation. With
the equivalent of glossy government online brochureS47
coupled with slow implementation, high default rates
persisted even after renegotiation took place. 48 Force feeding
will not work. The mistakes of HAMP should serve as a
warning bell for how we think about other initiatives,
including those that pertain to health care.
Given these lessons, the basic diagnosis of the path of the
ObamaCare legislation is already in, and it falsifies the
naive Baucus prediction that the distributive consequences
of complex legislation are benign. Let me explain very
briefly why this is supposed to be the case. According to
White House estimates, some 31 million people who are
currently outside the system will now be supplied with first
class health care. 49 I regard this claim as a snare and a
delusion. There is not enough money in the public treasury
to give that number of people the lavish set of benefits
mandated under ObamaCare. You cannot supply Cadillac
health care50 to that number of people, many of whom are in
46. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: SUMMARY OF
GUIDELINES (2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/

guidelinessummary.pdf.
47. See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov
(last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
48. Darrell Issa & Jim Jordan, Opinion, Cleaning Up the Mortgage Mess, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2010), http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB1000142405274870407560457
5356663725805580.html ("HAMP has failed to meet the administration's own
projections. According to government figures released on Monday, only 434,716
homeowners have received permanent mortgage modifications as of July.
Meanwhile, the Treasury Department has cancelled the temporary modifications of
616,839 borrowers, with 96,025 modifications cancelled last month alone.").
49. Remarks on Health Care Reform, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 147 (Mar.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPDat
available
2010),
3,
201000147.pdf ("Even those Who acknowledge the problem of the uninsured say we
just can't afford to help them right now, which is why the Republican proposal only
covers 3 million uninsured Americans while we cover over 31 million.").
50. "Cadillac" health plans are high-cost health plans with low deductibles,
drug coverage, vision and dental care, and low or no copayments. See Keith B.
Richburg, What Makes a Health Care Plan a 'Cadillac?,WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/30/AR2009093004
730.html.
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bad shape, while keeping the current levels of health care in
place for everyone else who now finds coverage within the
system.
One key problem is how to arrange for a system in which
the government pays the bulk of the bill while the insured
has options of which coverage to demand. This is not the
usual price control problem of government intervention in
private markets. Rather, this is a greater problem of trying
to figure out how to limit private discretion when the
individual who chooses coverage often pays less than 10% of
the bill. There is no good way to estimate the dollars. Nor is
there any private benchmark against which the coverage
can be measured, given that the massive controls and taxes
on the private sector will so influence prices that no one can
treat this overheated and overregulated private market as
the lodestar for the government-dominated subsidized
market.
This overemphasis on health care benefits relative to
other needs leads to real distortions when we know that it is
quite unlikely that individuals in this targeted group would
make this same level of heavy health care expenditures if
they had received outright cash grants. Generally speaking,
most people will intuitively gravitate towards an "equalmarginal" solution. They want their last dollar spent on
health care to give them the same amount of benefit as it
gives them on education, on food and shelter, on recreation,
and on everything else. Exactly how they achieve that
objective is hard to state in the abstract, but the want of
concrete knowledge on this point furnishes no argument for
additional government mandates. It is an argument for
private choices because it is much easier for individuals to
make their own equal-marginal judgments than it is for
them to explain to everybody else how they made their
judgments and why those outcomes are right for themselves,
even if they might prove wrong for everybody else.
By pushing large new sums of wealth into health care in
so haphazard a fashion, serving this new population will
turn out to be more expensive than we might suppose. Yet
the only place that that money can come from is out of the
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hide of median voter,5 1 either in terms of higher taxes or a
value-added tax (VAT) which many European countries
commonly use to fund their rather expensive welfare
states. 52 Additionally, it is harder to make a VAT
progressive even if the income tax is progressive. The VAT
will become a broad-based tax, which will hit the middle
class. 53 Here in the United States, the adverse consequences
of ObamaCare are likely to cut more deeply, for the median
voter is likely to lose his or her healthcare coverage from the
implementation of this program. So much for the benevolent
redistribution of Senator Baucus.
A quick look at calculations will, without question, confirm
quantitatively what is known qualitatively. Just simply
looking at the size and the scope of the obligation, it becomes
evident that too much has been bit off too soon. First, just
posit that the average benefit package will be provided at a
cost, on average, of $3,000 per person annually-an estimate
that looks low. Multiply that by thirty million people, and
you come up with a figure of around $900 billion in annual
expenditures if nothing is done to control the cost side,
which is no easy task given the dominant role that the
government as purchaser of health care services. As usual,
ObamaCare makes no effort to reengineer services that
could be rationally reorganized, such that the likely
pushback will require doctors and other health care
providers to receive fewer dollars while providing more
extensive services.
The upshot will be that the same physicians-and it is not
all physicians-who favor ObamaCare in the abstract 54 Will
51. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Hon.
Jerry Lewis, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations
Comm. (May 11, 2010) (on file with the Cong. Budget Office), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/docll490/LewisLtrHR3590.pdf.
52. Fred Lucas, Obama Administration Sends Mixed Message on VAT as Fiscal
Commission Prepares First Meeting, CNS
NEWS
(Apr. 23,
2010),
http://www.cnsnews.cominewslarticle/64671.
53. JANICE SHAW CROUSE, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AM., OBAMANOMICS:
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSES AND COMMENTARY RELATED TO THE FINANCIAL IMPACT
OF
OBAMACARE
ON
WOMEN
AND
FAMILIES
31
(2010),
http://www.cwfa.org/images/content/Obamanomics.pdf
(noting that European
value-added taxes average around 20% and in the United States, such a tax set at
10% could raise perhaps $500 billion per year, or about $4,300 per household).
54. See generally, Ryan M. Antiel, et al., Physicians' Beliefs and U.S. Health
Care Reform-A National Survey, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0907876?ssource=hcrc.
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flee from the system when and if the new system of fee
reimbursement is put into place.5 5 Short of involuntary
servitude, the government cannot alter the supply curve of
physicians. Fewer dollars means fewer doctors. In
particular, many primary care physicians near retirement
age will elect to take that option. Take a physician at an age
at which early retirement or job redeployment is a viable
option-say, in his or her late fifties or early sixties. Early
retirement becomes the only option if the government
pushes through a decline in rates that will not allow
physicians to cover their extensive costs in administering
these new programs while simultaneously meeting
preexisting obligations (including rent and support staff).
The usual consequence of price controls is shortages; thanks
to ObamaCare, we can expect shortages in the supply of
physicians, and particularly in those who supply primary
care.
The situation will get worse because the economics of
private health care plans will be so costly that the payment
of penalty tax amounting to 2.5% of their household income
may look attractive to nearly four million people.5 6 This
disintegration of the private health care system may well be
the ulterior motive of many ObamaCare supporters who
think that a single-payer system can avoid the many pitfalls
of the current market. But if so, the campaign for
ObamaCare will have turned out to be a classic case of bait
and switch.
A central theme of the Obama's 2008 campaign and the
early months of his presidency was that "[i]f you have
insurance that you like, then you will be able to keep that
insurance." 57 In retrospect, this was not a real promise. The
first thing you discovered when you looked at the statute is
that the definition of a "grandfathered health plan" is wholly
unclear. Right now we know that adding new employees or
new dependents of old or new employees does not deny a
55. See infra note 94.
56. Stephen Ohlemacher, Nearly 4M People Could Pay Without Health
Coverage, YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 22, 2010), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Nearly4M-people-could-pay-apf-2747238688.html.
57. Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session on
Health Care Reform, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 604 (July 28, 2009), available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900604.pdf.
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plan protected status. But it is not clear from reading the act
exactly what happens if there are any other changes to the
plan, such as changes in coverage, price, mergers, and the
like. As one study noted, "[i]t is still not clear, however,
whether any significant modifications of coverage under a
plan design will alter its grandfathered status,"58 a
regrettable state of affairs that once again shows the
enormous impact that the regulations will have on the scope
of the action. It could easily turn out when the dust settles
that any important change is tantamount to creating a new
plan and losing their protected status.
Of course, every health plan is amended countless times in
order to take into account difference in rates, coverage,
benefits, formulas, and so forth. By one reading of the statue
definition, each of us, quite without our own knowledge, has
been enrolled in hundreds of different plans over the years,
all of which, strangely, have had the same single plan
number. But even for grandfathered plans that run this
gauntlet, the established rules are not inviolate. There are
phased introductions of substantive requirements that apply
to these plans, dealing with key issues such as preexisting
conditions, coverage for dependents up to age twenty-six,
rescission, and coverage limits, each of which has its own
complex web of interpretive rules. 59 It looks like a classical
instance of undermining ordinary expectations with a set of
highly restrictive and counterintuitive statutory definitions.
But regardless of the rhetoric, within five years the original
grandfathered plan will be as extinct as the dodo.
But before then, all these fine points really matter. The
new plans do not get statutory protection from government
oversight. The new plans all have to receive that
benediction, which they can only get if they run through a
regulatory gauntlet, which-in total disregard of marginalist
principles-operates as though more health care is
invariably better for the consumer than less. But without
any grandfathered protection, everyone starts at square one
58. BENICO, GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLANS AND THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010), available at http://www.benico.com/docs/

Grandfathered health-plans(PPACA).pdf
(discussing
(Preservation of Right to Maintain Existing Coverage)).
59. Id. at 2.

ObamaCare

HeinOnline -- 15 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 19 2010-2011

§

1251

20

Texas Review of Law & Politics

Vol. 15

in a regulatory environment that is not quite to their liking.
In time, historical continuity was displaced by a view that
additional levels of consumer protection were required,
without any real showing of systematic dissatisfaction by
the people who were actually enrolled in these various plans.
Throw in mandates and other regulatory hurdles, and the
administrative load becomes truly high. Yet higher taxes
and higher unemployment levels can accentuate the
downward slide in a double dip recession, which will add
more people to an overextended public sector with an
insatiable appetite for huge, but unfunded, state subsidies.
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

There are many people who think that such gloomy
forecasts are inappropriate.60 Unfortunately, we already
have an early warning signal that no combination of taxes
and regulations can cover the expanded obligation base.
That warning comes in the form of the extended legal battle
now taking place in Massachusetts over RomneyCare, 6 ' the
so-called "Republican model" 62 for the national health care
plan. In February 2010, Massachusetts Governor Deval
Patrick persuaded his insurance commission to switch from
a "notice" system to a "prior approval" system of rate
regulation in reviewing the new set of rate packages put
forward by the various health care plans.63
The difference between the notice and approval systems is
huge in dealing with insurance. A notice system is
essentially a full disclosure system. Pilgrim Health Care, a
large state insurer, has to give notice to the state
commission of how it plans to proceed with various groups of
insureds. Thus, it is imperative that the insurer supplies the
60. For a view typical of the ObamaCare boosters, see Jonathan Cohn, On the
House, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.tnr.com/article/health-care/thehouse.
61. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,
at http://www.malegislature.gov/
ACTS ch. 58, available
2006 MASS.
Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2006/Chapter58
62. See Edmund F. Haislmaier, Mitt's Fit: Romney's Health Plan Is No Sop to
Socialism, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2006), http://old.nationalreview.com/
27
2
comment/haislmaier 00601 1110.asp.
63. Kay Lazar, Michael Levenson & Robert Weisman, Patrick Wants Health
Cost Veto, I0S. GLOBE (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/locall
2
massachusetts/articles/2010/0 /11/patrick_wants_health_costveto/.
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plans that it announces, as a check against insurer fraud by
way of a bait-and-switch operation. However, the firm that
supplies notice has complete freedom in setting its rates
without any administrative hassle or blowback. The
insurance commission relies on competition to restrain
rates. It makes no effort to try to figure out which rates give
the firm a suitable rate of return.
The moment a state switches to an approval system, it has
essentially abandoned that disclosure model in favor of a
new procedure that lets government agents determine
whether or not industry firms have garnered "excessive
profits." Now some may say that this is something that
governments always do when dealing with regulated
industries. That proposition is both right and wrong. Such
government approval is something governments do when
they regulate industries with some kind of a monopoly
power-typically the network industries that supply power
or telecommunications utilities.64 But it is not the kind of
task that governments usually undertake with regard to
competitive industries, where there are no monopoly profits
to bleed out of the system. What government regulation can
do in competitive industries is create mischief by reducing
the prices charged by participant companies so that they
cannot earn a competitive rate of return, even as they are
forced to bear the new compliance costs of a regulatory
regime that treats their every action under a presumption of
distrust.
In principle, an approval system should give rise to
serious constitutional challenges, even under the very weak
laws of property protection that exist in other areas. 65 With
rate regulation, the law requires concern over whether the
rates allowed permit the company to earn a risk-adjusted
rate of return. 66 Both Massachusetts and Maine, however,
have explicitly disavowed that standard. Their definition of
64. See generally, LAWRENCE J. WHITE, U.S. PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD NETWORK
INDUSTRIES 22 (1999).
65. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of regulation, see Richard
A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 293 (1999). For a more general statement of the problem, see
Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism,55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(1992).
66. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315-16 (1989).
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"excessive" is no longer whether one receives a monopoly
rate of return, which everybody admits that you are not.
Rather, the newer definition of "excessive" now condemns
making the kinds of profits that only seem to be
inappropriate to a large firm at a time when there are many
people without any healthcare coverage at all. That sharethe-wealth-and share-the-misery-approach has made a
difference. The Massachusetts Insurance Commission in
February 2010 managed to reject 235 out of 274 proposed
rate increases, promising to allow only smaller increases in
exchange.6 7 In the interim, the insurance companies
announced that they would not sell insurance coverage to
some 800,000 individuals in that market niche until the
legal position had been clarified. 68 Massachusetts did not
take this threat to leave lying down and responded that it
would fine any company with the temerity to withdraw from
the local market. In response, the insurance carriers filed a
lawsuit seeking to knock out the statute, but the
Massachusetts Superior Court quickly announced that it
would only hear the case after the matter had gone through
several additional months of administrative hearings. 69 In
the interim, the court was not prepared to allow the
companies any level of increased revenues, deeming that
their cash position was strong enough to avoid bankruptcy
and that they could recoup the additional fees from their
many individual policyholders to the extent that these might
be ultimately granted. 70 Several days later, the same court
held that the state was entitled to enforce its rate orders in
part because its orders were endowed with a presumption of
legitimacy, which meant that the state did not have to prove
irreparable harm to force the individual insurance

67. Paul Howard, Bay State Health-Care Blues, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 5,
2010), http://www.nationalreview.comlarticles/243613/bay-state-health-care-bluespaul-howard.
68. Thomas Cheplick, Massachusetts Health InsuranceRate Cap Creates Legal,
Financial Problems, HEARTLAND INST. (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.heartland.org/
healthpolicy-news.org/article/28147/Massachusetts HealthInsuranceRateCap
CreatesLegalFinancial Problems.html.
69. Mass. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Murphy, No. 10-1377-BLS2, 2010 WL
2102726 (Mass. Super. Apr. 12, 2010).
70. Id. at *10-11.
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companies to remain in the marketplace.7 1 The older
tradition whereby the constitutionality of rates was
determined before they were put into effect has not been
followed.
The Massachusetts saga has yet to wind itself down. But
the situation is ominous. The procedural delays could easily
slow down the review of the applications for rate increases
next year. Ultimately, there are two scenarios: either the
companies win and they pull out of the state, at which point
Massachusetts has a real problem of how to supply coverage
when faced with heavy deficits, or the companies lose, at
which point they go bankrupt in the short run and the state
has to face exactly the same problem, only on a larger scale.
In Massachusetts, the rock and the hard place are the only
two possible outcomes. The ostensible purpose of
ObamaCare is that when government imposes rates
regulation on private firms, they will unearth magical
efficiencies that no one thought possible. Necessity is thus
the mother of invention, and firms innovate in ways that
they did not think possible before the government
intervened. But this bit of wishful thinking ignores the
reality of the competitive forces which drive firms to find
low-cost ways to deliver health care. And it understates the
likelihood, which is already in place, that smaller firms will
rush to find larger partners in order to rid themselves of the
high fixed costs of regulatory compliance. 72 Concentrated
industries may be less than ideal, but they are preferable to
bankrupt firms.
V. THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS
The ostensible reason for why health care is "different" is
that it should be possible to squeeze out the waste in the
system through prudent price regulation. One impetus for
the Massachusetts plan was the comprehensive reviews on
the cost of delivering health care in the United States

71. Mass. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Murphy, No. 10-1377-BLS2, 2010 WL
2102723 (Mass. Super. Apr. 23, 2010).
72. See Robert Pear, Consumer Risks Feared as Health Law Spurs Mergers,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/health/policy/
21health.html.
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through the Dartmouth Atlas, 73 which announces its mission
in no uncertain terms:
For more than 20 years, the Dartmouth Atlas Project
has documented glaring variations in how medical
resources are distributed and used in the United States.
The project uses Medicare data to provide information and
analysis about national, regional, and local markets, as
well as hospitals and their affiliated physicians. This
research has helped policymakers, the media, health care
analysts and others improve their understanding of our
health care system and forms the foundation for many of
the ongoing efforts to improve health and health systems
across America. 74
The immediate question raised by these studies is why
these gaps do not disappear under the force of market
pressures. There are two explanations. The first starts with
restriction of the Dartmouth Atlas to "Medicare Data,"
which is not a randomly selected set of data. 75 It is data that
comes exclusively from one, albeit massive, government
program. To the extent that these price differentials are
unjustified, it represents condemnation on how government
provides its services. If twenty years of work has not
eliminated these gaps, why think that clever maneuvers in
the next iteration of health care reform will change the
results?
At this point, two questions surge to the fore. The first is
whether these price differentials are found on the private
side of the marketplace, for which the answer seems to be
no. Tomas Philipson and his colleagues have done careful
studies for paired patients in Medicare and in private plans
which show that the differentials are far smaller in the
private sector than under Medicare, 76 largely competed away
on the private side where the gaps are in the order of three

73. See DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
74. Id.
75. See Frequently Asked Questions, DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE,
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/gettingstarted/faq/ (noting that the Atlas "focus[es]
on Medicare data").
76. Tomas J. Philipson et al., Geographic Variation in Health Care: The Role of
PrivateMarkets, 2010 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: SPRING 325.
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to four times smaller.77 On this model, the sensible response
is to deviate away from Medicare in order to find a relatively
fast way to control for differences.
A second difficulty with the Dartmouth studies is that
they do not control for success. The studies on price
differentials often show the costs incurred in the year before
death, which can vary substantially by institutions. But in
and of itself, it shows nothing until evidence is presented
about the people in the different treatment centers who live.
A cancer program that saves 60% of its patients may well
cost more than one that saves only 20% of its patients. But
the cost differential that seems justified by these outcomes is
lost if you only look at the dead patients in both groups.
Put both of these points together, and it becomes clear
that the overall estimations of health care effectiveness are
very difficult to make. Yet it is an implicit assumption
behind ObamaCare, like it was behind the Massachusetts
system, that regulation of the private sector could eliminate
its persistent and large inefficiencies in the private sector,
and so too for the endemic weaknesses in the government
sector. But the former is in all likelihood more efficient than
was presupposed, and the latter is more difficult to correct.
The false optimism of comprehensive health care reform
follows from the combined impact of these two plans. But
owing to the complexity of the underlying institutional
arrangements, one pointed prediction is that imposing price
controls on top of the current system will not improve
matters in either the short or long run. It is yet another
instance where the Baucus hope of smooth redistribution is
so misguided.78 The Baucus approach creates a greater level
of confusion and chaos than is now in place, as everybody
tries to scramble for some private advantage. Some firms
will get windfalls; some will disappear in mergers and other
takeovers; and still others will perish. The upshot is a
demand for nationalization, now that the so-called private
sector will have failed yet again.

77. Id. at 350-51.
78. See Dem Senator: Health Legislation Will Address the "Mal-Distribution of
Income in America," supra note 37.

HeinOnline -- 15 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 25 2010-2011

26

Texas Review of Law & Politics

Vol. 15

VI. SOME MECHANICS OF OBAMACARE
As with so much complex legislation, lofty objectives are
often undermined by sloppy mechanics, and nowhere is that
more true than with ObamaCare. I will discuss two major
problem areas apart from what I have previously discussed
above: first, the private insurance exchanges, and second,
state involvement with Medicare and Medicaid.

A. Private Insurance Exchanges
The first major challenge for ObamaCare is to structure
its so-called "insurance exchanges."79 Like all exchanges, the
health care exchange is not an open access regime. The only
insurers entitled to join that exchange have to meet certain
key requirements: for example, the kinds of coverage they
have to supply, the persons to whom they must supply it,
and the number and types of individuals they have to enroll.
The fixes here standardize some portion of the insurance
deal in ways that undermine the ability of innovative firms
to gain greater market share by altering the type of coverage
that they choose to supply.
Here is one example of the problem: in ordinary private
markets, individual firms often specialize in particular
niches where they have expertise. Some insurance
companies will target the main consumer markets; others
may choose to specialize in older populations or those
subject to the risk of certain kinds of diseases, such as
cancer or heart attacks. High-risk customers can afford huge
opportunities for insurers to profit by managing risk, so long
as the firm is able to charge premiums that cover both the
risks that remain and the administrative costs of reducing
those risks to an acceptable level. Because specialization in
subpopulations is a way in which most insurance markets
work, there is no reason to force all insurance companies to
offer coverage in geographical regions they do not want to go
or in patient populations they do not wish to cover. The
secret to success in every market is the ability of a firm to
79. For my earlier account on this score, somewhat outdated by the passage of
events, see Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance
Reform: Why the Reid Bill Is Unconstitutional,MED. PROGRESS TODAY (Dec. 18,
2009), http://www.medicalprogresstoday.comlenewsletters/mpt ind.php?pid=1834
&nid=250.
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move simultaneously on multiple margins so as to get the
best mix for it and its customers. The need is to keep prices
high enough to cover costs but low enough to keep and
attract customers. Any and all efforts to maximize profits
must be made in light of the threat of entry. Nothing
concentrates the mind so well.
Now, nobody can say that this art of designing an
insurance policy, or indeed a complex array of insurance
policies, always succeeds. Yet by the same token, no one
should ever insist on matters of system design that the best
be the enemy of the good. What can be said with some
confidence about these health care programs is that they do
a pretty good job of mixing, matching, and monitoring. In
running a health care network, it is extremely difficult to
make sure that physicians perform as desired, given the
manifest agency-costs problems in overseeing highly paid
professionals. Every physician is going to be under constant
pressure by patients who want ever more care for fixed
payments that they have already made. Physicians often
show personal loyalties to their patients. But every time an
insurer or other health care provider lets expenses run out of
control, the added costs are borne by other patients. At some
point-I do not know where that point comes-the health
care provider has to act like the Grinch. Profligacy will
jeopardize the long-term sustainability of the health care
program.
One certain road to perdition in this environment is to
make a decision to honor all patient health care requests
that provide some value for their patients. It is never the
right question to ask whether in each instance a health care
plan provides benefits greater than zero. The answer to that
question is virtually always yes. The harder question for the
health care provider is whether the benefit sought is greater
than the cost of supplying it, for which there are no clearly
quantifiable answers on either the benefit or the cost side of
the equation. Thus, any successful firm has to develop very
accurate internal measures and maintain strong internal
controls to succeed, all of which relate to its patient base and
physician pool. The ability to collect and interpret aggregate
data is critical. This process necessarily requires the
successful firm to take some, but not all, control over
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patients out of the hands of physicians. One reason why
many doctors do not like health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and insurance companies is that they use overall
measurements and tested protocols to displace the judgment
of individual physicians who are trained to have unwavering
confidence in their own judgment.
These tasks are made vastly more complex if any health
care plan is required to accept all comers,s0 without rights of
refusal based on preexisting medical condition or other
background risk conditions.8 1 Companies are similarly
subject to obligations for the guaranteed renewal of
coverage82 and are denied any rights of rescission. 83
Underwriting is thus removed by participation on the
exchange, which is a de facto necessity to attract the
government contribution to individual patients. At this
point, a good reputation can work in reverse by leading to an
oversubscription of patients whom the plan does not have
the capacity to serve. Somebody has to be refused.
Unfortunately, under ObamaCare, an external randomized
program determines who gets accepted and who gets
rejected, without regard to the way in which the composition
of the patient pool may influence the costs of providing
needed services. ObamaCare does not have any obvious
dollar-for-dollar revenue offset even for those insurers
taking on an abundance of high-cost and high-risk patients,
including those with known and expensive preexisting
conditions. Any firm's ability to market to discrete
populations through age, sex, disease, condition, or location
segmentation is heavily compromised.
And it gets even worse. While the firm has an obligation to
take patients with known disabilities, the patients have no
obligation to stay with the firm. The adverse selection
problem thus grows by leaps and bounds. The experience
under the Massachusetts law bears this out. 8 4 People sign
80. See ObamaCare § 2702 (Guaranteed Availability of Coverage).
81. See id. § 2704(a) ("A group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not impose any
preexisting condition exclusion with respect to such plan or coverage.").
82. See id. § 2793 (Health Ins. Consumer Info).
83. See id. §2712 (Prohibitions on Rescissions).

84. See Kay Lazar, Short-term Customers Boosting Health Costs, Bos. GLOBE
(Apr.

4,

2010),

http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/
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up just before they need major treatment, and then
withdraw from the plan when their treatment is completed.
The premiums cannot adjust to the risk because the implicit
assumption in this market is that only insurers play
questionable games in dealing with patients. But that
assumption goes against the entire history of insurance law,
in which the greater knowledge that insureds have of their
condition imbues them with duties to disclose relevant
conditions to the insurer. This authorizes insurers to write
policies that protect them against this risk of adverse
selection, which has individuals sign up when they know
that their expected benefits will exceed their premiums.8 5
The Massachusetts plan thus has the risks running in the
wrong direction, which is what happens when a deep
ideological priority blocks a more serious consideration of
where the real risks lie.
Unfortunately, there is no effective firm response once
consumer opportunism is allowed to run riot. The only way
to make up the loss on problem cases is through premium
hikes on well-behaved plan participants, but at this point
those healthy individuals have a strong incentive to leave
the pool because their risks are not sufficiently large to
justify the added costs. Thus, the whole market on the
private side unravels unless the state imposes heavily
coercive measures on well-behaved customers. But there is
no reason why the preexisting conditions have to present an
insuperable obstacle to rational insurance markets. In the
mid-1990s, John Cochrane of the University of Chicago
Booth School of Business and I independently developed a
contractual solution that relies on long-term contracts to

04/04/shortterm customers boosting healthcosts/ ("Thousands of consumers are
gaming Massachusetts' 2006 health insurance law by buying insurance when they
need to cover pricey medical care, such as fertility treatments and knee surgery,
and then swiftly dropping coverage, a practice that insurance executives say is
driving up costs for other people and small businesses.").
85. See, e.g., Lindenau v. Desborough, 108 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1163 (1828) (Bayley,
J.). In Lindenau, the court stated,
I think that in all cases of insurance, whether on ships, houses, or
lives, the underwriter should be informed of every material circumstance
within the knowledge of the assured; and that the proper question is,
whether any particular circumstance was in fact material? [sic] and not
whether the party believed it to be so.
Id.
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handle the problem of preexisting conditions. 86 The basic
idea is as follows: In the good state of the world when you
are twenty-five, like most graduate students, you go out and
buy two kinds of insurance. The first kind is insurance to
cover you for the present year, and the second is a different
kind of insurance that gives you "bad news" coverage in the
event that some bad condition should show up in your life. If
an insurance carrier could keep everybody in these
programs, the amount of money that an insurance carrier
earns on the "bad news" portion of the premium situation
should be able to cover the higher rates needed for those
people with newly emergent conditions.
Note that this program gives all young people an incentive
to buy insurance early. That is the exact opposite of the
current situation in Massachusetts, where it pays for people
to wait until they get bad news before buying insurance.
However, this two-part plan only works if the companies
that supply it can be sure that they can keep all the "bad
news" money if their insureds decide to cancel their policy.
At this point, job portability can be improved because the
bad news part of the coverage can be transferred across
insurers if workers change jobs. Yet the whole program will
fall to pieces if healthy insureds are allowed to withdraw
from the program at will, recovering their bad news
premiums in full once they chose to leave the system. A
viable long-term system depends on holding both insureds
and their insurers to their long-term contracts. Yet once
health care becomes a "right," no one has a real incentive to
buy protection when healthy for the time that they become
sick. Better to wait when the now-preexisting condition does
not allow the insurer the right to raise premiums or exclude
you from the plan. There is, sadly, a bipartisan consensus in
favor of this fashionable-but-flawed view of insurance
without any correlation between the risk assumed and the
premiums collected.8 7
There is a lesson to be learned about the stability of
insurance plans. No plan will prove to be stable if people can
86. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE 138-40 (1997); John H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance,
103 J. POL. ECON. 445 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Access to Affordable Health Care,supra note 34.
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enter and exit at will in order to pick up subsidies that
someone else has to pay. Voluntary markets may well price
some people out of the market, but they surely prevent the
fatal disintegration which shuts down the market. So long
as no one receives a conscious cross-subsidy, people will stay
in a plan that costs them less than it is worth. If their
premiums are computed correctly, they no longer worry
about the composition of the pool, no matter who else is in
the plan. They will always look for better offers, which will
come only from a company that can provide the same
coverage for less, precisely as things should be in a
competitive environment. The great genius of this system is
that it does not matter to anyone who else has insurance
from this company. But if each person has to insure the
risks of others, then everyone wants to be in a pool where
they receive subsidies from others, which is a simple
impossibility. The moral is this: think of insurance for
yourself as a right, and be prepared to have it become a
duty.
These exchanges, therefore, are faced with difficulties at
every turn, given that there is no pricing system that can
handle the implicit subsidies given to so many individuals at
one time. These exchanges could easily break down. Just
because an exchange is open for business does not mean that
somebody will decide to participate in it. These logistics are
not easy to resolve. It will not be easy to push employers or
insurers much harder. Nor can one push harder on health
care providers. So it is back to the usual outcome under
price controls. It is necessary to constrain prices by letting
let people form queues, which dissipate some of the demand.
That will happen in the United States, as it has long
occurred in Canada.*8 How long the queue becomes depends
on the size of the subsidies to those in need of health care.
There are no easy fixes.

B. State Involvement with Medicare and Medicaid
The difficulties on the private side are matched by those
on the public side, through Medicare and Medicaid, whose
88. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Long Lines Mar Canada's Low-Cost Health Care,

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A3.
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pricing structures do nothing to constrain the demand for
medical services. Nobody who has looked at Medicare
finances over the last ten years questions these particulars.
But on the question of whether the system will become
insolvent, the only question is when: 2016, 2018, or 2022?
The 2010 Annual Report for the Trustees of Social Security
and Medicare states officially that the passage of
ObamaCare has pushed back by twelve years the date at
which Medicare is anticipated to go insolvent, from 2017 to
2029.89 It sounds, therefore, that it is possible to get blood
from a stone. But the same report that makes this rosy
report contains an unusual disclaimer by Richard S. Foster,
its chief actuary, which reveals the exact opposite message,
worth quoting in part:
[T]he financial projections shown in this report for
Medicare do not represent a reasonable expectation for
actual program operations in either the short range (as a
result of the unsustainable reductions in physician
payment rates) or the long range (because of the strong
likelihood that the statutory reductions in price updates
for most categories of Medicare provider services will not
be viable).9 o
Mr. Foster has put his finger on the essential difficulty.
The numbers that the Medicare report relied upon are
make-believe. ObamaCare included a set of cuts in
reimbursement fees that are not sustainable. Congress has
imposed these restrictions before but has always relented in
order to keep doctors inside the system. The same scheme
will play out on a grand scale under ObamaCare. Foster
does give his estimate of when the system will go into debt,
but without some genuine change, that date will come
sooner than 2017, and certainly not later.
Medicaid is in the same dire straits. Right now it is a
dominant component of most state budgets. States, such as
Illinois, are consistently in arrears on their payments for
nine months up to one year, simply because they cannot
89. Soc. SEC. AND MEDICARE BDS OF TRS, A SUMMARY OF THE 2010 ANNUAL
REPORTS (2010).
90. RICHARD S. FOSTER, STATEMENT OF ACTUARIAL OPINION, 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HosP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTAL MED.
INS. TRUST FUNDS 282 (2010).
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meet the revenue requirements.91 No private institution can
afford to wait that long for reimbursement without getting a
costly interim line of credit financing, because workers and
customers cannot wait that long for their repayment.
Now, what is going to happen? On Medicare, it may be
possible to means-test some of the benefits, which will make
a small dent in the program but not much. Right now, there
are different rates for individuals in different income
brackets, but those charged to the richest taxpayers are still
well below cost. I do not expect that to change radically in
the near future. It seems almost foolish to ask if political
wisdom exists in Washington to make the hard choices. The
answer, of course, is that there is none. Partisanship here is
not necessary because there are few Republicans willing to
call for a reexamination of the benefit structures under
Medicare from the ground up. Rather, during the debate
over ObamaCare, most Republicans treated the need to
protect this massive subsidy for their preferred clientele as
an objection to introducing a second one. What is needed is
more Republicans who are prepared to look hard at the
embedded cross-subsidies driving the Medicare program.
What is not needed is more Democrats living under the
delusion that we can afford to expand Medicare subsidies to
just about everyone. In this case the intellectual rot starts at
the top: knowing presidential gazes, lofty claims, and
rhetorical self-confidence do not a coherent health care
program make. 92 We cannot reduce deficits by first spending
91. See Emma Jackson, Tough Choices Ahead as State Fiscal Crisis Threatens
17,
2010),
(Feb.
REPORTS
Program, MEDILL
Illinois' Medicaid
Jackson
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=157156.
reports,
Medicaid liabilities roughly total $663 million, according to the Illinois
Dept. of Healthcare and Family Services, and monthly payments to safety
net hospitals aren't covered under the prompt pay requirements, leaving
those providers out in the cold . .. . With tax revenues at a record low,
Illinois has been using short-term borrowing to fix the Medicaid funding
crisis.

Id.
92. See, e.g., Remarks to the American Medical Association National Conference
in Chicago, Illinois, 2009 DAiLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 466 (June 15, 2009), availableat
There President
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900466.pdf.
Obama stated,
[W]e will keep this promise: If you like your doctor, you will be able to
keep your doctor. Period. If you like your health care plan, you will be
able to keep your health care plan. Period. No one will take it away. No
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trillions of dollars in the hope that the money will
materialize from economic growth that is already being
stifled by the prospect of higher taxes in 2011. Nor is it
possible to balance a budget by collecting taxes over ten
years and spending the revenues within seven years. 93
On the Medicaid side, matters are even more complicated
because ObamaCare hopes to ramp up the payments for
Medicaid recipients. It will offer some federal subsidies in
the short run, but in the long run, it will be up to the states
to pick up an ever larger share of the bill. 94 A convenient
summary of these complex provisions is found in a complaint
that Florida and other states have brought against the
United States government for its encroachment on state
sovereignty through the operation of this program. It is
worth quoting in full, if only to illustrate the massive but
unsustainable nature of this program:
40. The Act requires states to expand massively their
Medicaid programs and to create exchanges through which
individuals can purchase healthcare insurance coverage.
The federal government is to provide partial funding for
the exchanges, but will cease doing so after 2015. Should a
state not wish to participate in the exchanges, it can opt
out only if it provides coverage for uninsured individuals
with incomes between 133 percent and 200 percent of the
federal poverty level, a higher income level than that
which would be applied for participating states under the
Act. The only other way for a state to avoid the Act's
requirements is to drop out of the Medicaid program,
leaving millions of persons uninsured.
41. Those states left with no practical alternative but to
participate in the Act will have to expand their Medicaid
coverage to include all individuals under age 65 with
incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level. The
states' coverage burdens will increase significantly after
2016, both in actual dollars and in proportion to the
contributions of the federal government.
matter what. My view is that health care reform should be guided by a
simple principle: fix what's broken and build on what works.

Id.
93. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE FACT SHEET: MEDICARE
SPENDING AND FINANCING (2010), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-05.pdf.
94. See generally ObamaCare § 2201 (Enrollment Simplification and
Coordination with State Health Insurance Exchanges).
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42. The federal government will not provide necessary
funding or resources to the states to administer the Act.
Nevertheless, states will be required to provide oversight
of the newly-created insurance markets, including, inter
alia, instituting regulations, consumer protections, rate
reviews, solvency and reserve fund requirements, and
premium taxes. States also must enroll all of the newlyeligible Medicaid beneficiaries (many of whom will be
subject to a penalty if they fail to enroll), coordinate
enrollment with the new exchanges, and implement other
specified changes. The Act further requires states to
establish an office of health insurance consumer assistance
or an ombudsman program to advocate for people in the
new programs.9 5
On this occasion, I do not wish to comment on the
constitutional issues raised by this provision.96 The states
face a Hobson's choice. They are technically not required to
participate in this program, but if they don't, they will be
forced to take up insurance without federal assistance for
many of their neediest residents. Correspondingly, their
citizens will be forced to pay into the federal treasury to
support Medicaid payments to citizens in other states. So
companies have to stay in, but the denial of an effective exit
right does not put the needed dollars in the state to cover
these onerous obligations. The specter of large pensions for
public employees is not some abstract danger down the road.
It is a present reality for the many major states forced to
slash other programs relating to social services and
education at both the K-12 and university level. 97 There is
only so long that anyone can pretend that fiscal woes at one
level of government can be cured by payments from some
other level of government. If federal, state, and local
governments all face serious problems with bloated public
budgets, none can lend a boost to any of the others. The only
interesting question is not whether any of these ships can
95. Complaint at 10-11, Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10cv-91 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010).
96. See Richard A. Epstein, ObamaCare's Phony Medicaid 'Deal' The New
Health Law Unconstitutionally Coerces the States, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2010, at
Al5.
97. See, e.g., N.J. Gov. Chris Christie's Budget Is Expected to Slash School
Funds by $820M, NJ.CoM (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssfl
2010/03/nj-school officials.budget.cut.html.
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right themselves under their current burdens. It is the
sadder question: which of these ships will sink first, and will
it bring down others in the undertow?
VII. CONCLUSIONS: NEGATIVE SYNERGIES

We can now see the combined effect of ObamaCare on the
public and private sides. The private insurance market is
likely to implode under the combined weight of mandates
and price constraints, which will hit hardest at the small
and individual market. These market segments are likely
going to prove unsustainable without subsidies, and
probably unsustainable even with subsides. But pushing
these people into the public sector will not work, given the
antiquated structure and shaky finances of both Medicare
and Medicaid, neither of which is designed for universal
coverage. But other sources of revenue are not available
unless large segments of the economy are reformed, starting
with bloated public pensions. Reform, therefore, will be a
horrific struggle as it turns out that the only sacred
contractual obligations in the eyes of some courts are those
which states enter into with their unions. At bottom, these
are only disguised multiperiod transfer payments from
ordinary taxpayers to union retirees overpaid by a factor of
two or three. To use the sanctity of contract argument to
protect bloated payments resulting from self-dealing is the
wrong way to go.
We can thus see the real dilemma, which explains why
Bleak Prospects is an appropriate title for this Article. The
health care problem cannot be cured on the backs of other
institutions. Yet at present, there is no real willingness on
the part of either political party to rethink this problem from
the ground up. There is no easy way to handle this question
if we try to regulate the terms and conditions of medical
service in great detail. The more promising alternative is to
find ways to provide relatively modest cash transfers to
people on a need-basis to supplement the purchase of private
health care insurance. Such an approach is exemplified by
the program that Governor Mitch Daniels has implemented
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in Indiana,9 8 targeting individuals in need of assistance
while ineligible for Medicaid.
Without a detailed analysis of the Indiana program, it
should be sufficient to point out the philosophical orientation
that animates its differences from the federal approach.
ObamaCare starts from the assumption that private
markets cannot work without heavy government oversight,
which it imposes with ruinous consequences. In contrast, the
Daniels program starts with the assumption that markets
work well and then seeks to make modest wealth transfers
to level access to health care, without trying to rework the
system from the ground up. It adheres far more closely to
the maxim of "redistribution last."
Of course, the Indiana program is not pure laissez-faire,
which might in fact be the better alternative if building a
system up from the ground floor. But for these purposes, it is
sufficient to point out that in a head-to-head comparison, in
the early going, Indiana beats Massachusetts in a landslide.
The only real question is whether intelligent reform at the
state level can survive foolish regulation at the federal level.
No one knows the answer to that question. But it is being
becoming increasingly clear that the passage of ObamaCare
has not ended the debate over health care reform in the
United States. Perhaps the silver lining is that ObamaCare
is so bad that it may not survive the rout of the Democrats
in the November 2010 midterm elections. After all, as Rahm
Emanuel once said, a crisis is too important to waste. 99

98. See Paul Howard, Will ObamaCareKill Indiana's PromisingExperiment in
2010),
4,
(Aug.
ACTION
IN
IDEAS
Reform?,
Health-Care
http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcsdaily/2010/08/wil-obamacare-kill-indianaspromising-experiment-in-health-care-reform.html.
99. See Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,
2008, at A2.
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